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Chapter 2
MACROECONOMIC ASPECTS OF
CROATIA’S ACCESSION TO THE
EUROPEAN UNION
Dubravko Mihaljek*
Bank for International Settlements
Basel
The one lesson that emerges is the need to keep trying. No miracles. No
perfection. No millennium. No apocalypse. We must cultivate a scepti-
cal faith, avoid dogma, listen and watch well, try to clarify and define
ends, the better to choose means.
David S. Landes, The Wealth and Poverty of Nations (1999), p. 524.
ABSTRACT
This paper analyses the main macroeconomic conditions for
joining the EU and the European Monetary Union (EMU), the readi-
ness of the Croatian economy to meet these conditions, and the main
challenges for economic policy on the road to these integrations.
Croatia does not lag significantly behind the other CEE countries in
fulfilling the criteria for EU and EMU membership. It has certain
advantages with respect to the criteria of macroeconomic stability
(with the exception of the budget deficit), investment efficiency, and
potential growth. However, delays in the implementation of some
structural reforms, in particular the development of a securities market,
*The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessary represent those
of the BIS. The author is taking part in this project as an independent researcher. He
would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for helpful comments and suggestions.
are estimated at about four years. The main challenges for economic
policy in the run-up to EU and EMU are expected to be reducing the
budget deficit and stabilising the public debt. Moreover, macroeconom-
ic policies should remain prudent so as to strengthen external stability
and maintain favourable conditions for growth.
Key words: 
Croatian economy, Central European economies, enlargement of the
EU, transition, convergence to the EMU, economic growth, inflation,
external stability, budget deficit, public debt
INTRODUCTION 
This paper analyses three topics related to Croatia’s accession to
the EU and EMU: the macroeconomic conditions for joining the EU
and EMU, the preparedness of the Croatian economy to meet these con-
ditions, and the main challenges that are awaiting economic policy on
the road to the EU and EMU.
The second chapter describes certain differences in the process
of EU integration as between Croatia and other CEE countries and
analyses the economic significance of the criteria for EU membership,
known as the Copenhagen criteria. These criteria relate primarily to the
development of the fundamental political, economic, administrative and
judicial institutions with the aim of creating as quickly as possible the
conditions for the adjustment of the countries of CEE to the institution-
al framework of the EU. After they become EU members, the countries
of Central and Eastern Europe will have the obligation to join the EMU
and accept the euro as the common currency. To be admitted to EMU,
countries will have to demonstrate that they are capable of maintaining
macroeconomic stability for at least two years. To pass this test, coun-
tries will have to fulfil the Maastricht criteria on the rate of inflation,
interest rate, exchange rate, budget deficit and public debt. Since these
conditions are defined more precisely than the Copenhagen criteria and
are easier to monitor, they are being thoroughly analysed in the litera-
ture, including this paper.
The third chapter assesses the readiness of the Croatian econo-
my to join the EU and EMU. It carefully analyses comparative econom-
ic indicators for Croatia and five other Central European countries
(Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia), as well as
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some less developed current EU members (Greece, Ireland, Portugal
and Spain). The main conclusion of these comparisons is that Croatia
does not lag behind other Central European countries and even has cer-
tain advantages with respect to the main macroeconomic criteria (apart
from the budget deficit), investment efficiency and potential growth.
However, the delay in the implementation of some important microeco-
nomic reforms, such as the development of non-bank financial markets
and competition policy, is estimated at almost four years.
Chapter Four addresses the issues of the sustainability and stabil-
ity of the process of real and nominal convergence. Although current indi-
cators of macroeconomic stability for Croatia and other Central European
countries are mostly satisfactory, the experience of some members of
EMU shows that the final phase of convergence can be the most difficult.
The main challenge for Croatia in this context will be to reduce the budg-
et deficit and stabilise the share of public debt in GDP. Moreover, macro-
economic policies will have to remain prudent so as to maintain the exter-
nal stability and make use of the potential for relatively strong growth.
The fifth chapter concludes the discussion and provides some recommen-
dations for economic policy. 
CONDITIONS FOR JOINING THE EU
This chapter briefly considers the basic economic and institu-
tional framework that the EU has elaborated for future members. The
economically relevant criteria for the accession of Croatia to the EU can
be divided into two groups: conditions that derive from the Stability and
Association Agreement (2001), which the EU had expressly devised for
the countries of SEE; and the Copenhagen criteria, which apply to all
applicants from CEE and are also included in the Stability and
Association Agreement. Criteria from the Maastricht Treaty on EMU
have to be met by all EU members before they can adopt the euro as
their common currency. The framework set in these three groups of cri-
teria forms, in a way, a goal that the Croatian economy and, in particu-
lar, the public administration should aim for in the macroeconomic
sphere in order to join the EU and EMU as soon as possible. In spite of
frequent interpretations, most of these conditions have not been phrased
extremely rigidly, but leave Croatia and other applicant countries a cer-
tain flexibility to adapt, in agreement with the European Commission,
some of the conditions to the particular circumstances.
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Box 1. The Stabilisation and Association Agreement
The SAA between Croatia and the EU was signed on 29
November 2001 and by summer 2002 it had been ratified by
Austria, Denmark and Ireland. The Agreement governs coopera-
tion and the framework for the gradual convergence of Croatia to
European structures. The SAA contains provisions on cooperation
and mutual obligations in the following areas: political dialogue,
regional cooperation, free movement of goods, movement of
workers, establishment of businesses, the supply of services, cur-
rent payments and movements of capital, harmonisation and
implementation of legislation and the rules of market competition,
cooperation in the area of justice and internal affairs, the policy of
cooperation and financial cooperation. Thus in the trade part of the
Agreement a transitional period of three or six years in which
Croatia will liberalise its market for industrial and agricultural
products from the EU was agreed on. That is, as early as
November 2000, the EU had decided, with certain exceptions, to
liberalise its market for Croatian products.ii Apart from the provi-
sions about political dialogue and regional cooperation, the provi-
sions of the SAA closely resemble those of the Europe
Agreements signed by the current accession countries.
In the regional cooperation provisions, it is anticipated that
there will be a network of bilateral treaties with countries that have
signed the SAA, other countries covered by the stabilisation and
association process and with EU accession applicants. It is clearly
stated that the goals of the regional provisions are the establish-
ment of political dialogue, the establishment of an area of free
trade in the region in line with WTO provisions, mutual conces-
sions concerning the movement of workers, establishment, supply
of services, current payments and movement of capital and other
policies related to movement of persons, as well as cooperation in
justice and home affairs. The creation of any kind of new state or
other structures in the region is not envisaged in the Agreement,
nor is it mentioned.
In the political preamble and in the appropriate parts of the
Agreement it is clearly stated that Croatian accession to the EU
will be based on the individual merits of Croatia. In particular, the
readiness of Croatia to move from the status of potential candidate
to that of official candidate for EU membership will be based on
the individual capacity of Croatia to make the legal, economic and
political adjustments required under the SAA and its readiness to
contribute to regional cooperation and stability in SEE.
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The Stabilisation and Association Agreement
Croatia’s accession process differs from the accession of the
current applicant countries – the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland,
Slovakia, Slovenia, the Baltic countries and Bulgaria and Romania.
During the nineties, these countries initially obtained the status of asso-
ciated countries after the EU entered into the so-called Europe Agree-
ments with them. By carrying out these agreements, the associated
countries, after a few years, acquired the status of candidates for mem-
bership in the Union.i 
Because of the events of the war in the area of the former
Yugoslavia, Croatia began developing closer relations with the Union
only at the end of the nineties. In June 1999 the EU adopted the Process
of Stabilisation and Association for the Republic of Croatia, BH, Alba-
nia, Macedonia and FR Yugoslavia) (European Commission, 2002a).
The fundamental instrument for the implementation of the Process is the
SAA. This treaty constitutes a new generation of agreements concerning
associated membership in the EU. The main difference between the SAA
and the Europe Agreements is in the contents of the so-called evolution-
ary clause, and in the provisions about regional cooperation (see Box
1).iii While the Europe Agreements specifically stated the integration of
the countries of CEE into the EU as their basic goal, the SAA assigns
Croatia the status of potential applicant for EU membership, on condi-
tion that it not only meets the Copenhagen criteria but also lives up to the
obligations concerning regional cooperation. The rationale for these pro-
visions is to encourage the countries in SEE to behave towards each
other and work with each other in a manner comparable to the relation-
ships that now exists between EU members (European Commission,
2002a). The requirement for the countries in the region to establish a net-
work of close contractual relationships reflects the same logic on which
the bilateral relationships with the EU (as represented by Stabilisation
and Association Agreements) are built.iv
Joining the European Union
The basic conditions for the enlargement of the EU were already
set out in Article O of the Treaty of Rome (1957), modified in 1997 in the
Treaty of Amsterdam: “any European state which respects the principles
of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental free-
doms, and the rule of law may apply to become a Member of the Union
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(European Commission, 2001,7). In 1993, at the Copenhagen European
Council, the EU adopted a decision according to which the “associated
countries in central and eastern Europe that so desire shall become mem-
bers of the EU” (ibid. p. 8). The decision also defined the membership cri-
teria – the so-called Copenhagen criteria – the basic objective of which
was to set out the appropriate framework for the gradual integration of the
countries of CEE into the EU:
• stability of institutions that guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human
rights and the respect for and protection of minorities,
• the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity
to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union,
• the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adher-
ence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.
At the Madrid European Council in 1995, a fourth group of mem-
bership criteria was added:
• the adjustment of administrative and judicial structures to EU standards
in order to ensure the effective implementation of the legislative frame-
work taken over from the EU in the context of the first three items. 
The legal patrimony of the EU that applicant countries bind them-
selves to take over and apply is known by the name of the acquis commu-
nautaire. The acquis is divided into 31 chapters:
1. Free movement of goods
2. Free movement of persons
3. Free supply of services
4. Free movement of capital
5. Company Law
6. Market competition policy
7. Agriculture
8. Fisheries
9. Transport policy
10. Taxation
11. Economic and monetary
12. Statistics
13. Social policy and employement
14. Energy
15. Industrial policy
16. Small and medim sized enterprises
17. Science and research
18. Education and further education
19. Telecommunications and informa-
tion technology
20. Culture abd audio-visual policy
21. Regional policy and coordination of
structural instruments
22. The environment
23. Consumer protection, health care 
24. Cooperation in teh area of justice
and internal affairs
25. Customs union
26. Foreign relations
27. Common foreign and security policy
28. Financial control
29. Financial and budgetary provisions
30. Institutions
31. Miscalleneous
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Probably the most important macroeconomic criteria for joining
the EU are central bank independence and the prohibition on central banks
financing of national budget deficits. The European Central Bank assesses
regularly the fulfilment of these conditions. During 2002, the ECB sever-
al times gave public warnings to the governments of the Czech Republic,
Hungary and Poland that some of the proposed laws were encroaching on
the independence of the central banks and hence jeopardised the chances
of these countries to successfully conclude their accession negotiations.
The actual accession negotiations deal primarily with conditions
under which the applicant countries will accept, apply and administrative-
ly and legally implement different chapters of the acquis. Experience to
date has shown that there is enough flexibility in these negotiations for
individual legislative approaches to be adapted to the specific conditions.
Poland, for example, negotiated a transitional period of 12 years for the
complete liberalisation of the market in agricultural land (including the
right of Union residents to buy agricultural land in Poland), while the
European Commission, during the negotiations, had proposed a period of
seven years. In other words, how much, during the assumption of the
acquis, given solutions will suit the interests of the applicant country de-
pends, among other things, on the expertise and capacities of the relevant
structures of the public administration in its negotiations with the EU. 
Candidate countries are obliged to accept national programmes for
implementation of the acquis, and the EU regularly assesses the progress
made in the implementation of these programmes. By summer 2002, all
the applicant countries from CEE had started negotiations on about 30
chapters of the acquis (apart from Romania, currently negotiating about 24
chapters). Most chapters have been agreed on with Lithuania (28), then
with Estonia, Latvia and Slovenia (27 chapters each), Slovakia (26), Czech
Republic and Poland (25), Hungary (24), Bulgaria (20) and Romania (12)
(Deutsche Bank, 2002). Croatia is bound to meet the Copenhagen criteria
pursuant to the SAA; the results achieved in this area will be considered in
the next chapter.
Since considerable financial resources are necessary for accepting
the acquis and meeting the other conditions for membership, the European
Council earmarked up to 3.12 billion euros in its financial plan for 2000-
2006 for assistance to applicant countries (European Commission, 2001).
From 1993 to 2000, Croatia received a total of 358 million euros in assis-
tance from the EU, and the value of the CARDS programme for 2001
amounted to 60 million euros (European Commission, 2002b).v
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Joining the European Monetary Union
The eleventh Copenhagen criterion provides for the implemen-
tation of the objectives of economic and monetary union in the medi-
um term. Unlike the current members of the EU who have not joined
the EMU – Denmark, Sweden and the UK – the countries of CEE will
not be able to opt out of membership in EMU when they have met the
conditions for joining laid down in the Maastricht Treaty of 1992.
These conditions are as follows:
• Inflation. A Member State has to show a price stability performance
that is sustainable and an average rate of inflation, observed over a
period of one year before the examination, that does not exceed by
more than 1.5 percentage points that of, at most, the three best per-
forming Member States in terms of price stability. Inflation shall be
measured by means of the consumer price index on a comparable
basis, taking into account differences in national definitions
• Interest rate. Over a period of one year before the examination, a
Member State has to have an average nominal long-term interest rate
that does not exceed by more than 2 percentage points that of, at most,
the three best performing Member States in terms of price stability.
Interest rates shall be measured on the basis of long-term government
bonds or comparable securities, taking into account differences in
national definitions;
• Exchange rate. A Member State has to respect the normal fluctuation
margins provided for by the exchange-rate mechanism of the European
Monetary System without severe tensions for at least the last two years
before the examination. In particular, the Member State shall not have
devalued its currency on its own initiative for the same period.
• The general government deficit may not exceed 3% of GDP, or
should be falling substantially or only be temporarily above though
still close to this level;
• Gross general government debt may not exceed 60% of GDP at mar-
ket prices, or must at least show a sufficiently diminishing (rate) and
approaching the reference value at a satisfactory (rate).
Since these conditions are more precisely defined than the other
Copenhagen criteria, they have become in economic and business lit-
erature a synonym for the readiness of applicant countries to join the
EU. For this reason, this paper will also devote considerable attention
to the comparison of Croatia’s macroeconomic performance with the
Maastricht criteria. It is necessary, however, to stress that these condi-
tions need to be met only after the future members of the EU have
spent at least two years in the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM II) of
the European Monetary System. 
Although at first glance these conditions seem to have been laid
down very precisely, there is a certain amount of flexibility in them.
This pertains in particular to the size of public debt, or the tendency of
the debt to decline. Austria, Belgium, Greece, Italy and Holland entered
the EMU with a public debt in excess of 60% of GDP, and by the end
of 2001 only the Netherlands had reduced gross indebtedness below
that level.vi Italy also had problems meeting the budget deficit criterion.
From 1991 to 1996 the average budget deficit amounted to 9% of GDP.
As a criterion for EMU entry, the European Commission accepted the
promise (later fulfilled) that the deficit for 1997 and 1998 would be
lower than 3%. However, as far as Croatia is concerned, it would be
wiser not to rely on such precedents and meet all the criteria from the
outset, for the probability that the European Commission in an enlarged
EU would-be particularly well-disposed towards Croatia is very small.
THE READINESS OF THE
CROATIAN ECONOMY FOR THE EU
After the main economic criteria for Croatia’s accession to the
EU have been laid out, i.e., the objectives that the Croatian economy
should aim for in order to join the EU, this chapter considers the initial
conditions on the road to EU, i.e., to what extent the Croatian econo-
my lags behind or has any initial advantages over the EU applicant
countries. The analysis is divided into four parts: (i) a review of the
basic economic indicators of Croatia, the CEE countries, and the less
developed current members (Ireland, Greece, Portugal, Spain); (ii) the
evaluation of the EU concerning SAA implementation; (iii) a review of
EBRD transition indicators, which, to a certain extent, quantify the
Copenhagen criteria on the functioning of the market and the compet-
itive strength of the economy; (iv) an evaluation of the macroeconom-
ic performance of the Croatian economy based on the Maastricht crite-
ria. The general conclusion is that Croatia does not lag behind the other
CEE countries, or even has certain advantages in terms of the main
macroeconomic indicators. However, there is a marked delay in the
33
34
implementation of some important microeconomic segments of the
acquis, such as the legal system, competition policy, the development
of the non-bank financial system and the share of the private sector in
the economy. Since these institutions are vital for the normal function-
ing of the market economy and competitiveness of the corporate sec-
tor, it can be estimated that, provided macroeconomic stability is
preserved, Croatia will need another four to five years of structural re-
forms to catch up with the level of readiness for EU already achieved
by the advanced transition economies.
The main economic indicators
With GDP per capita of $4,600 in 2001 (24% of the EU aver-
age), Croatia was in the same position as Hungary and Poland (Table
1). The per capita income of the Czech Republic was 30% higher, and
that of Slovenia 130% higher, while compared with Slovakia per capi-
ta income in Croatia was a quarter higher. Greece, Ireland and Spain
had a considerably higher per capita income (in terms of EU average)
before joining the EU.vii However, Portugal had in 1986 the same per
capita income in terms of EU average as Croatia in 2001. Judging by
this basic indicator of development, then, Croatia does not lag substan-
tially behind the other applicants for EU membership.
Also surprising is the fact that Croatia does not lag behind in
terms of two other basic indicators: GDP growth and labour productiv-
ity growth. From 1995 to 2001, real GDP in Croatia rose at an average
annual rate of 4%, somewhat slower than in Slovenia, but 10% faster
than in Hungary and twice as fast as in the Czech Republic.viii Only the
Slovak and Polish economies grew faster on average over this period.
With a productivity growth of 5.4% in the 1995-2001 period, Croatia
was in the first place among the countries considered; productivity
growth of more than 4% per annum was achieved only in Poland and
Ireland. Wages rose twice as fast as productivity, however (by 11.4%
a year in real terms), so the competitiveness of the Croatian economy
was considerably reduced according to this criterion. Rapid growth in
productivity was partly achieved through reduction in employment, on
average by 1.3% a year, highest among the countries in central Eu-
rope.ix Together with Poland and Slovakia, Croatia also stands out in
terms of very high unemployment; the other central European coun-
tries have reduced their rate of unemployment to below 10% and thus
have converged with the EU average.x
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Table 1. Main economic indicators for the Central European contries and the EU
Popu-
lation
2001
(mil.)
GDP
2001
(bil-
lion
EUR)
Per capita GDP
Growth rate 
1995-20011 Unem-
ploy-
ment
rate4,5USD2,3
Percenta-
ge of EU
average3
Real
GDP
Produ-
ctivity 
Employ-
ment4
Croatia 4.4 22.6 4,605 24 4.0 5.4 -1.3 16.3
Czech R. 10.3 62.1 5,530 29 2.0 2.5 -0.5 8.9
Hungary 10.0 57.4 4,660 24 3.6 3.3 0.4 8.4
Poland 38.7 197.8 4,560 24 4.8 4.5 0.4 17.3
Slovakia 5.4 22.7 3,700 19 4.4 3.8 0.6 18.2
Slovenia 2.0 20.9 10,605 56 4.1 3.1 1.0 5.9
Greece 10.9 30.4 5,700 63 3.3 2.5 0.8 10.4
Ireland 3.9 96.7 2,420 57 9.2 4.0 5.1 3.8
Portugal 10.3 122.6 2,240 24 3.3 0.8 2.7 10.6
Spain 41.1 651.6 4,420 47 3.5 3.1 0.3 4.1
EU 377.5 8,812 19,060 100 2.6 1.5 1.1 8.0
1 Annual average, in percent.
2 GDP at current prices in domestic currency, converted into US dollars at annual
average exchange rates.
3 For current EU members, GDP per capita and percentage of EU average in year of
joining the EU (Greece 1981, Ireland 1973, Portugal and Spain 1986); For EU candi-
date countries data refers to 2001.
4 Based on labour force surveys. 
5 Average for 2001.
Sources: UN Economic Commission for Europe; European Central Bank; IMF;
Eurostat; EBRD; national statistical agencies
EU members
By far the best economic performance among the countries in
Table 1 was achieved by Ireland. With a growth of as much as 9.2%
pa, the real GDP of Ireland increased by 70% between 1995 and 2001,
and per capita income by 44% (from 18,500 to 26,600 USD). More-
over, Ireland achieved a growth rate of employment of more than 5%
a year, resulting in a decline in unemployment from about 15% at the
beginning of the nineties to only 3.8% in 2001. Ireland can therefore
justly stand as a model for the transition economies.
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Evaluation of the European Commission
from April 2002
In its first stabilisation and association report on Croatia from
April 2002, the European Commission evaluated that Croatia had con-
tinued to make progress in the process of transition to a free market econ-
omy (European Commission, 2002c). Concerning regional cooperation
– the main additional condition for Croatia’s accession to the EU – the
European Commission judged that the government accepted the need to
normalise relations and strengthen bilateral cooperation with neighbour-
ing countries. However, Croatia continued to fear that closer relations
with the neighbours would lead to the re-emergence of a regional identi-
ty and hold back its ambitions for European integration. As a conse-
quence, “the authorities show a clear lack of enthusiasm for any region-
al initiatives with the other SAA countries” (ibid., p. 10). This evaluation
does not diminish the considerable success achieved in concluding bilat-
eral free trade agreements with BH, Macedonia, Hungary, Slovenia,
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Turkey, and
the negotiations on free trade that started at the time with Albania and FR
Yugoslavia (and have since been successfully concluded).
Regarding fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria, the following
judgements of the European Commission should be noted.
As for the political conditions, the European Commission is
concerned by the situation in the judiciary, which are characterised by
serious organisational problems, inefficiency of procedures, lack of
expertise and long delays in the conclusion of cases. “Radical reforms
are needed but no substantial progress has been made. This weakness
has direct impacts on implementation of the rule of law, which remains
problematic and uneven” (ibid., p. 4).
Turning to the existence of a free-market economy and structur-
al reforms, the European Commission notes that a major part of the
economy is privately owned; privatisation and restructuring of state-
owned firms is proceeding slowly; and the importance of the grey econ-
omy is estimated to have declined (ibid.,  pp. 15, 17). However, the abil-
ity of the corporate sector to withstand competitive pressure and to cope
with market forces in the Union differs considerably across sectors.
• Agricultural products (10% of Croatia’s total imports, of which 42%
comes from the EU, and 14% of total exports, of which 10% goes to
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the EU) are considered uncompetitive on the EU market. Since the
degree of protection of agriculture was very high in the past, it is esti-
mated that agriculture will be most sensitive to trade liberalisation
(ibid., pp. 20 and 25).
• Regarding industrial products, the Commission notes that implemen-
tation of the Interim Agreement (through which trade with the EU
was liberalised in 2000) has not raised problems so far. Since Croatia
is the largest exporter to the EU from south-eastern Europe, it is
expected to be by far the most significant beneficiary of EU trade lib-
eralisation. However, the Croatian balance of trade with the EU
remains highly negative “due to the substantial reduction in Croatia’s
overall export level following its loss of international competitive-
ness – due essentially to wage growth above productivity growth,
delayed enterprise restructuring and insider privatisation. This trend
now seems to be slowly improving however.” (ibid., p. 20).
• The SME sector, which accounts for almost 45% of GDP, is slowly
becoming more dynamic, in particular by comparison with big indus-
try. But the international competitiveness of small and medium sized
enterprises is still low, and their orientation to foreign markets is
small (ibid., p. 24). 
• The service sector has been opening fast and performs well, with
growth of service exports above 10% pa. Croatia accounts for 70% of
the region’s exports of services. (ibid., p. 22). 
• In transport infrastructure, the European Commission sees Croatia as
an important transit country for road, rail and combined transport in
the Union. In the development of the energy sector, Croatia has a
potentially crucial role in the region. However, the Commission is
disappointed with the financial performance of HEP (electricity) and
INA (oil and gas), the state-owned companies that currently dominate
their sectors and enjoy a quasi-monopolistic position. This can be
partly attributed to insufficient investment in the energy infrastruc-
ture. The Commission is also concerned by the fall in the production
of domestic oil and gas and the faster rise in the consumption than in
the production of electricity (ibid. pp., 26-17). By contrast, Croatia
leads in the region in the telecom sector owing to successful privati-
sation, large investments and adequate regulation (ibid., p. 27).
In the financial system, the Commission notes that the results of
privatisation and the consolidation of the banking system have been
favourable and have strengthened the confidence of depositors in the
banks. The new central bank law, which provides for greater independ-
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ence of the CNB and mandates the central bank to put a strong emphasis
on price stability as the basic objective of monetary policy, is also viewed
positively. However, long-term finance is still scarce (because of prob-
lems with collateral); the non-banking financial system is poorly devel-
oped; and the environment in Croatia remains difficult for domestic and
foreign investment due to deficiencies in the bankruptcy law and proceed-
ings, inaccurate and incomplete cadastral records and land registry, and
significant and numerous bureaucratic hurdles) (ibid., pp. 16-17).
In connection with public finances it is pointed out that the tax
burden on the private sector in Croatia is among the highest in the
region, which has lowered profitability and driven some activities off
into the grey economy. The introduction of a single treasury account
has improved the management of the budget. However, the national
budget is not comprehensive and there are weaknesses in the formula-
tion, execution and control of budgetary resources (ibid., p. 17).
With respect to the adjustment of administrative structures to EU
standards, the Action Plan for the Implementation of the SAA is viewed
as evidence of the seriousness of the commitment of the government.
However, the timetable, which would require the government to trans-
fer 70% of the acquis in two years, is judged as highly ambitious and,
in the light of the experience of other countries, potentially unrealistic.
In particular, there is a lack of capacity, in terms of staff numbers and
the proper expertise necessary for the adjustment of many sectors to
European standards and the gradual implementation of the acquis (ibid.
p. 19). Encouraging initial results in the harmonisation of legislation
have been achieved in several areas: movement of capital, protection of
intellectual property rights, the company law (especially equal treat-
ment of foreign and local investors), accountancy standards etc. In
many areas, e.g., in consumer protection, industrial standards, the
implementation of the legislation on market competition, the regulation
of state aid to industry, considerable progress has yet to be made.
The functioning of the market and the
competitiveness of the economy
Is it possible to test independently the evaluations of the
European Commission on the functioning of market economy in Cro-
atia? To assess whether some market economy functions normally and
whether the corporate sector can withstand the competitive pressure
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inside the EU one would need to consider many different macro- and
microeconomic indicators. But even after such detailed analysis, any
final assessment of the preparedness of an economy for the EU would
reflect to a certain extent subjective judgement. In other words, there is
no summary indicator or a completely satisfying set of multidimen-
sional indicators of the degree of “maturity” of a market economy.
There are, however, certain approximations that can help make an
informed judgement with a fair degree of confidence. Since 1994, the
EBRD has been preparing it’s the so-called transition indicators that
rank the transition economies on a scale from 1 (the infancy of a mar-
ket economy) to 4 (developed market economy) according to five
groups of criteria – market, enterprises, financial institutions, infra-
structure and legal system. The indicators for Croatia and for five
Central European economies are shown in Table 2. The last column
shows the value of the indicator for Croatia as compared with the aver-
age of the other five countries; a value lower than 100 indicates a gap
between Croatia and the average of the five accession countries; a
value of 100 means that Croatia has an equal starting position; a value
greater than 100 indicates an advantage vis-à-vis the other countries.
According to the aggregate transition indicator, Croatia lags
about 10% behind the average of the selected transition economies, and
is comparable with Slovakia. The greatest progress has been made in
trade and foreign exchange system and in small-scale privatisation.
However, in several areas there is a pronounced difference between
Croatia and other accession countries:
• In competition policy Croatia has scored the lowest value of any indi-
cator in the table (2.3) and lags more than 20% behind the more
advanced transition economies. The low value of this indicator reflects
high obstacles to the entry of new firms to the market, and inadequate
implementation of the legislation and policy of market competition
with respect to firms that have a dominant market position. 
• In the category of the non-bank financial institutions, Croatia lags as
much as 25% behind the average of the applicant countries. The low
value of this indicator reflects the existence of a shallow securities
market and the low level of activity of brokers and other non-bank
financial intermediaries, as well as the rudimentary legislative frame-
work for the issuance of and trade in shares and bonds.
• In terms of development of the legal system Croatia lags about 20%
behind the average. The basic reasons are the inadequate and incon-
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Figure 1. Transition indicator and private sector share of GDP
Source: EBRD, 2002; author’s calculations
sistent application of the financial system laws and regulations, in
particular inadequate protection of the interests of creditors and own-
ers and problems with bankruptcy laws and procedures, because of
which legal uncertainty prevails. By contrast, commercial legislation
is judged to be adequate and the corresponding indicator is slightly
above the average for other countries.
• Because of poor corporate governance, inconsistent implementation
of the laws relating to bankruptcy and the lack of commitment in
strengthening market competition, Croatia still faces significant prob-
lems with large-scale privatisation and enterprise reform.
• There is also a considerable delay in the introduction of market prin-
ciples in the infrastructure, which covers energy, road and rail trans-
portation, telecommunications and water supply.
Low values of transition indicators are statistically highly corre-
lated with the private sector share of GDP. Croatia had in 2000 the low-
est private sector share in GDP of all the central European countries,
only 60%, the same as Macedonia, Ukraine and some Central Asian
economies. The coefficient of correlation between the aggregate transi-
tion indicator and the private sector share of GDP is 0.6. A simple
regression shows that for each 10 percentage point increase of the pri-
vate sector share in GDP, the aggregate transition indicator rises by 0.3,
i.e., by a tenth of the average value of this indicator in 2000 (Figure 1).xi
How long would it take Croatia to make up the large delay in
competition policy and non-bank financial institutions vis-à-vis the
other central European countries? To answer this question, we calcu-
lated the time that it took the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and
Slovenia to increase the average value of this indicator from 2 to 3. In
competition policy, it took these countries 3.5 years on average for this
increase, and in non-bank financial institutions 3.8 years.
It should be noted that the transition indicators in Table 2 refer
to the situation as of 2000. Since then, there has been progress in some
reform areas in Croatia, but also in the other CE economies, so the rel-
ative position of Croatia has probably not improved significantly
Convergence to the EMU
To what extent do Croatia and the CE transition economies
already meet the macroeconomic conditions for joining the EMU? To
answer this question it is necessary to recall that the decision on the ini-
tial members of the EMU was made in 1998 based on the data for 1997,
and that enlargement of the EU to Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia is
expected in 2004. Some of these countries could qualify to join the
EMU as early as 2007. Hence, an assessment of the readiness of the
transition economies for the EMU based on the data for 2001-2002 is
equivalent to the assessment of the preparedness of Ireland, Spain and
Portugal for EMU based on the data for 1993 (for Greece, based on the
1995 data). At that time, the Maastricht criteria had not been elaborat-
ed, so data for Germany served as the reference value (Table 3).
The transition economies were clearly much closer to meeting the
nominal convergence criteria in 2000–2001 than the less wealthy current
members of the EU were in the first half of the nineties. This relates
above all to public debt, which in all the transition economies is below
60% of GDP (though Croatia and Hungary are approaching the critical
level), while in Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain the public debt
amounted to 61-109% of GDP. Croatia, the Czech Republic and Poland
also meet the conditions for inflation, and Croatia, the Czech Republic
and Slovenia the condition for the long-term interest rate on government
bonds. All the six CE countries meet the condition for exchange rate sta-
bility. The largest deviation from the Maastricht pertains to the budget
deficit. In 2001, only Slovenia had a deficit below the critical level of 3%
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of GDP. Croatia had a deficit of as much as 6.6% of GDP, highest in cen-
tral Europe in 2001.xii However, transition economies were again much
closer to meeting this criterion than Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain
five years before they joined the EMU. One should also point out that the
transition economies have to meet much more stringent inflation and
interest rate criteria than Ireland, Portugal and Spain in the mid-nineties.
At the time, inflation and interest rates in the reference country, Germa-
ny, were considerably higher because of the macroeconomic pressures
following German reunification.
Compared with the other CE countries, Croatia is in a sound
position with respect to three criteria: inflation (it had the lowest rate
of inflation in the first half of 2002, only 2.5%), long-term interest
rates, and exchange rate stability. However, together with the Czech
Republic and Poland, Croatia needs to undertake considerable fiscal
adjustment: the budget deficit needs to be cut by more than 3.5% of
GDP. Another cause for concern is the high level of public debt (52%
of GDP), particularly if one takes into account the rapid increase in
debt in the second half of the nineties. Hence, although Croatia meets
the macroeconomic criteria for joining the EMU at the moment (with
the exception of the budget deficit), the issue is whether the current
macroeconomic performance is sustainable over the medium term.
This question is addressed in the next chapter.
IDENTIFICATION OF MACROECONOMIC
VULNERABILITIES
The experience of some current members of EMU indicates that
hopes about a steady fulfilment of the convergence criteria can unexpect-
edly and suddenly go sour. At the beginning of the nineties, when it
seemed that the convergence process was almost complete, the EMS did
not survive the burden of speculative attacks. The grounds for the spec-
ulation were doubts that arose in financial markets that some members
of the EMS would be able to mobilise adequate political support for the
implementation of the remaining fiscal adjustment. There were also con-
cerns that exchange rates of some currencies within the EMS were over-
valued. The experience of Spain is particularly instructive. At the begin-
ning of the nineties Spain was growing very rapidly, it enjoyed the con-
fidence of international capital markets and attracted large inflows of for-
eign capital. Convergence seemed within striking distance. However,
45
wages began to rise rapidly in an environment of expansion, leading to
higher inflation and undermining competitiveness of the economy, so
that in 1992 Spain was forced to devalue the peseta. 
Since Croatia and the other CE countries also face high current
account and fiscal deficits, and inflows of capital are creating a more or
less constant pressure on exchange rates and monetary policy, the ques-
tion arises as to whether they too will face a similar fate, irrespective of
the high degree of macroeconomic stability already achieved. To ans-
wer this question, it is necessary to establish the actual degree of macro-
economic stability and the main points of vulnerability at the macroeco-
nomic level. This paper deals with four questions: the outlook for rapid
and sustainable long-term growth, the outlook for low inflation; exter-
nal vulnerability, and the dynamics of budget deficits and public debt.
Outlook for long-term growth 
What are the perspectives for long-term growth in Croatia and
the other countries of CE? Apart from the Czech Republic, real GDP
in CE economies has expanded on average by 4-5% pa since 1995
(Table 4). Domestic demand – final consumption and gross invest-
ment – has in all the countries (with the exception of Hungary) made
a greater contribution to GDP growth (1.2 percentage points a year)
than net exports. In other words, only in Hungary have net exports
been sufficiently large to contribute to the growth of GDP. By con-
trast, negative contribution of net exports has reduced the growth of
GDP in Croatia and Slovakia by an average of 1.5 percentage points
a year. This implies that domestic demand has grown too fast, and
exports too slow, for the current composition of sources of growth in
Croatia and Slovakia to be sustainable over the long term.
This conclusion is supported by an analysis of the sources of
saving and investment. During 1995-2001, Croatia achieved an aver-
age investment rate of 24% of GDP. Since the rate of domestic sav-
ing was less than 18% of GDP, it was necessary to “import” more
than 6% of GDP of foreign capital per year in order to close the gap
between domestic investment and saving.xiii In this period, only
Slovakia relied more heavily on foreign borrowing. By contrast,
Slovenia financed more than 95% of its investment from domestic
saving (Croatia, only 74%).
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High current account deficits are not necessarily harmful to
economic growth, provided that investment goods rather than con-
sumer items are imported. In the structure of Croatian imports from
Table 4. Long-term growth, investment and saving in CE, 1995-2001
Growth Contribu- Contribu- Poten- Inve- Domestic Current 
of real tion of tion of net tial stment saving account
GDP1 domestic exports to growth rate rate balance
demand to GDP rate4
GDP growth2 growth3
Croatia 4.0 5.5 -1.6 5.0 23.8 17.4 -6.3
Czech R. 2.0 3.2 -1.2 3.5 29.8 25.3 -4.5
Hungary 3.6 2.7 0.9 4.7 22.9 19.2 -3.6
Poland 4.8 5.6 -0.8 4.8 22.9 19.8 -3.1
Slovakia 4.4 5.9 -1.5 5.2 32.5 25.7 -6.8
Slovenia 4.1 5.1 -0.9 5.6 25.9 24.6 -1.2
Average 3.8 4.7 -0.9 4.8 26.3 22.0 -4.3
1 Average annual growth rate, in percent.
2 Annual average; in percentage points.
3 Data for Croatia based on Mihaljek (2000); for Slovakia, on Consensus Economics
(2002); for other countries, on Huizinga et al. (2002).
4 Percent of GDP-a, annual average.
Sources: UN Economic Commission for Europe; European Central Bank; IMF;
national statistical agencies
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Figure 2. Investment and domestic savings, 1995-2001
Source: Domestic statistical agencies; ECB; author’s calculations
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1994 to 2000 a relatively high 20% is accounted for by investment
goods, and a moderate 29% by consumer goods, while raw materials
and intermediate products accounted for 51% of total imports. This is
a relatively high amount even if corrected for imports of energy (about
15% of total imports).xiv In other words, the main challenge for the
long-term sustainability of the current account in Croatia is not exces-
sive personal consumption, but rather insufficient domestic production
of various intermediate products for industry and services. The main
producers of such goods are usually small and medium-sized firms,
often in cooperation with foreign partners. 
It follows that the dynamic development of this sector and the
acceptance of the principle of specialisation and globalisation in pro-
duction are necessary to achieve long-term sustainable growth.
Croatia, on the other hand, stands out in terms of high efficien-
cy of investment. With a rate of investment that is 6% of GDP lower
compared to the Czech Republic and 9% lower compared to Slovakia,
Croatia had achieved a growth rate of GDP that is twice as high as in
the Czech Republic and almost the same as in Slovakia. Together with
Poland and Hungary, Croatia has achieved a similar efficiency of inv-
estment as the USA in 1993-99, i.e., an average growth rate of 4% with
a rate of investment of about 20% of GDP (Andersen, Ho and Miha-
ljek, 2001). Since investment efficiency in the EU is considerably lo-
wer (with a rate of investment of 20% of GDP, the EU realised an aver-
age growth rate of only 2.5% pa during 1993-99), there are good pro-
spects that Croatia will speed up its real convergence to the EU com-
pared with the other CE countries if it increases the rate of investment
in the mid-term.
The question that arises in this context is how the additional
investment could be financed. Further reliance on foreign borrowing is
limited by the high level of external indebtedness. It follows that it will
be necessary to increase domestic saving. This, in turn, requires the
development of domestic financial markets, which are still in their
infancy in Croatia. Since the investment and domestic saving rates are
highly correlated (Figure 2), the development of domestic financial
markets would enable not only faster but also more stable economic
growth, given that Croatia would no longer be so dependent on trends
in the international capital market, over which, like all small countries,
it has no control whatsoever.
What are the prospects for achieving the GDP growth necessary
for the convergence of per capita income to the average of the less
48
developed EU countries? The answer to this depends on the degree of
convergence one wishes to achieve. In an earlier paper by this author it
was shown that with an average growth rate of 5.5%, in the next 13
years, Croatia could double its current real per capita income to 10,000,
USD and thus reach 50% (instead of 33% at present) of the average per
capita income of Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain (Mihaljek, 2000).
To verify whether this “desirable” growth rate is close to the current
estimate of the potential growth rate, we used additional data for the
period from the end of 1998 to the first quarter of 2002 (Figure 3). This
test is important for the credibility of the previous estimates because in
1999 Croatia went through a recession, while in a revision of GDP data
published in September 2002 earlier growth estimates for 1999-2001
were reduced. The results show that even with the recession of 1999 and
downward revisions of GDP growth rates, the potential growth rate
from 1994 to mid-2002 came to almost 5%.xv Similar potential growth
rates were established for other CE countries as well (Table 4), and they
range from 3.5% for the Czech Republic to 5-6% for Slovenia. Together
with Slovakia and Slovenia, Croatia is thus in the group of the
economies with the highest potential for long-term growth in CE.
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Figure 3. Potential growth rate of the Croatian economy, 1994-2002.
Source: DZS; author’s calculations
Outlook for inflation 
Recent academic and policy discussions have challenged the
rationale for the Maastricht criterion of inflation for the transition
economies. Doubts about this criterion derive from the observation that
less developed countries have a considerably higher growth rate of pro-
ductivity in the process of catching up with the developed economies.
Faster productivity growth, especially in the advanced sectors exposed
to international competition (“tradables”), enables a rapid rise in wages
and, since labour is mobile, wages will also rise in protected sectors (or
“non-tradables”, such as personal services, construction, domestic
transport). In order to retain profitability, the less productive sectors
are forced to increase the prices of their products, which results in a
higher inflation than in the developed countries (assuming that the
prices of advanced products are determined on the world market). In
such conditions, if inflation resulting from the rapid productivity
growth was relatively high, transition economies would be forced to
increase interest rates and hence temporarily slow down economic
growth in order to achieve the Maastricht criterion on inflation.
In empirical research it has been shown that the so-called differ-
ential productivity (difference between productivity in advanced and in
protected sectors) has indeed risen very rapidly. In Croatia, differential
productivity growth has averaged almost 4% per year (in comparison
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Figure 4. Difference in inflation rates Croatia vs. average of the three coun-
tries with lowest inflation in the euro area (percentages)
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with 1.8% in the Eurozone), and in Slovenia and the Czech Republic
even higher (Mihaljek, 2002). However, most recent research has also
shown that faster productivity growth can explain at most about 30%
of the differences in the rates of inflation between the transition econo-
mies and the euro area (ibid., p. 17). Accordingly, if the CE countries
have problems meeting the inflation criterion, the reason will probably
be poor economic policy and not the operation of the Balassa-Samuel-
son effect.
Croatia for the time being meets the inflation criterion relative-
ly comfortably in comparison with other CE countries; this criterion
was fulfilled in the first half of 2002 and in 1995-1996 (Figure 4).
However, it should not be forgotten that Croatia still has to cope with
considerable adjustments of the relative prices in the protected sectors
(energy, real estate, health care, education). Price increases in these
sectors will probably raise inflation over the medium term. Therefore,
there are strong reasons for monetary policy to remain prudent with
regard to inflation.
External stability
According to standard external vulnerability indicators, the
degree of external stability in Croatia is similar to that of other CE
countries (Table 5). Croatia has certain advantages in the following
indicators:
• Exchange rate stability. The real effective exchange rate of the kuna
increased by less than 4% between 1995 and 2001, compared with a
25% increase for the Czech koruna and the Hungarian forint, almost
50% increase for the Polish zloty, and 20% increase for the Slovak
koruna. Only the Slovenian tolar has depreciated in real effective
terms (and then only slightly) in the last five years.
• Improving exports and current account. Contrary to the widespread
beliefs, Croatian exports of goods and services have been rising rela-
tively fast in the last few years: by almost 9% pa in dollar terms dur-
ing 2000-2001, and about 3% in the first five months of 2002 due to
the slowdown in the world economy. The current account balance has
improved considerably, with the deficit of about 3% of GDP in 2001
being much lower than in the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia
(5-6% of GDP).
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• Relatively large inflows of foreign direct investment (FID). As in
other CE countries, the current account deficit in Croatia has been
easily covered by FDI inflows. Moreover, FDI has increased in
Croatia in recent years to 6.2% of GDP, larger amounts having been
drawn in only by the Czech Republic (9.2% of GDP). 
• High official reserves. At the end of 2001, disposable foreign curren-
cy reserves of the CNB covered more than five months of imports of
goods and services, the same as in Poland. In 2002, the import cov-
erage rose to 6.7 months, the highest in the region. High foreign cur-
rency reserves along with low inflation, a sound growth in exports
and further foreign direct investment provide solid insurance for con-
tinued exchange rate stability.
However, foreign indebtedness and credit rating indicators are
less favourable than those of the other CE countries, with the exception
of Slovakia.
• Total foreign debt as percentage of GDP is the second highest in the
region and came to 56% of GDP at the end of 2001; only Hungary
was more indebted (65% of GDP). A particular concern is the ten-
dency for the external debt to increase rapidly, by 7% of GDP dur-
ing 1999 and 2001. The external debt increased at a faster pace only
in Slovenia in this period (i.e., by 9% of GDP); however, this
increase occurred from a much lower level of total debt (36% of
GDP). The structure of foreign debt in terms of domestic sectors is
relatively even. The public sector is the biggest debtor (43% of total
foreign debt); followed by the non-financial sector (27%) and
domestic commercial banks (19%); while 10% of the foreign debt
derives from direct investment. This debt structure leaves some
room for the reduction of the total level of indebtedness in the medi-
um term without any negative consequences to economic growth.
For example, while lower public debt is necessary for the sake of
attaining fiscal sustainability and the reinforcement of external sta-
bility, the private sector debt and indebtedness deriving from foreign
direct investment can be increased without any threat to macroeco-
nomic and external stability.
• Capacity to repay the foreign debt is lower than in the other CE coun-
tries except in Poland, as 20% of export income has to be used for
principal and interest payments, as against 15% in Hungary, Slovakia
and Slovenia, and less than 9% in the Czech Republic. 
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• The coverage of short-term foreign debt by foreign currency reserves is
relatively low: foreign debt falling due within one year would absorb
60% of disposable international reserves of the CNB if the public and
the private sector were to become insolvent. This indicator is even more
unfavourable in the Czech Republic and Slovakia (75-80% of reserves)
and reveals potential problems with the servicing of short-term debt in
the event of a sudden depreciation of the domestic currency. The Czech
Republic and Slovakia, however, have greater capacities to service the
foreign debt.
• Although in the last few years the spread on Croatian government
bonds has been reduced, it is still considerably above the average for the
region: about 190 basis points (1.9 percentage points) in compared to
only 40 basis points in Slovenia and 100-120 points in the Czech
Republic, Hungary and Slovakia. This shows that foreign investors con-
tinue to have certain reservations about the credibility of the overall eco-
nomic policy of the Croatian government. Along with Slovakia, the
credit rating of the government debt of Croatia is the lowest in the
region, and lies at the border between speculative and mature forms of
investment. By contrast, the government bonds of Slovenia and Hun-
gary are considered investment grade, entailing a risk similar to that of
the bonds of most of the countries of the EU.xvi A further negative fac-
tor is that the credit rating of Croatia has not improved since it was first
quoted in January 1997, while the ratings of Hungary and Slovenia have
improved since 1999. 
What are the implications of these vulnerabilities for the sustain-
ability of external equilibrium in the medium term? The needs for the
external financing of the private and public sector in Croatia in 2002-2004
are estimated at about 3 billion USD pa (IMF, 2002a; 25). It is anticipat-
ed that about 60% of new debt will be covered by the issue of bonds and
contracting of medium and long-term loans (for which the interest on the
government bonds serves as a reference). With the current rate of interest
of 4.6% on a ten-year German government bond and an interest spread of
190 points for Croatian government bonds, about 97 million USD would
have to be spent each year on servicing the new borrowings projected for
2002–04. If the interest spread increased by one percent (100 points),
because of the perception of increased risk of investing in Croatia, serv-
icing would cost another 15 million USD pa. This amount, of course,
would not threaten Croatia’s external stability, but it is not insignificant
for public finances: 15 million USD amounts to almost 10% of the annu-
al budgetary resources spent on science and technology.
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During a crisis, the bond spread would probably not increase by
a hundred but by several hundred basis points. At the time of the
Russian crisis in 1998, for instance, the spread on the bonds of the
Republic of Croatia jumped in less than two months from 200 to 930
basis points. Under such circumstances, new borrowing is impossible
regardless of the interest rate, because international investors seek liq-
uidity and are not at all prepared to invest in risky securities. New
issues markets can dry up completely for several months, with serious
consequences for the highly indebted emerging economies. Develo-
pments since the Turkish and Argentine crises of 2001-2002 indicate
that investors in the meantime have started to distinguish better those
economies that are good risks from those that are bad, so that extreme
cases of contagion on the financial markets (like the Asian and Russian
crises of 1997-1998) are generally no longer expected (see BIS, 2002).
For Croatia this is good news because currently it has found favour
with foreign investors. But at the same time one should bear in mind
that, given the greater ability of investors to distinguish among emerg-
ing economies, any threats to macroeconomic stability would be cost-
ly for the Croatian economy and would have long-term negative con-
sequences for economic development.
The budget deficit and the public debt
Apart from Croatia, the CE countries were closer to having a
budget deficit of 3% of GDP in 1999 than in 2001 (Table 3). The
chances for 2002 and the years to come are even less favourable. A
moderate revival of the world economy is expected only later in 2003.
On the other hand, the needs of the public sector in central European
economies are very large in the medium term because of the necessary
adjustments in the health care, education, pensions system, infrastruc-
ture, agriculture and environmental protection sectors. All this will cre-
ate a pressure on the budgets of central governments and local units in
both Croatia and the other CE countries. The Czech Republic is expect-
ed, for instance, to record a budget deficit in the region of 6-7% of
GDP in 2002, and Hungary of 7-8%. 
Some public finance experts have argued that reducing the
budget deficit is essentially a matter of political will, and have referred
to the experience of Italy, which has managed to reduce its long-stand-
ing deficits of 9-10% of GDP to less than 3% since 1997 (Gros, 2001).
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The case of Italy is, however, rather specific. Extensive development
of a welfare state and economic subsidies can be reduced in the short
term without negative consequences for growth, but not the expendi-
tures for structural reforms necessary for long-term sustainable growth
in the transition economies. The European Commission has therefore
argued that in the period before joining the EU it would be wrong to
aim fiscal policy at the attainment of the Maastricht criterion for budg-
et deficit while neglecting structural reforms and the implementation of
the acquis (European Commission, 2001e; 126). The financial markets,
on the other hand, look upon large deficits with suspicion, irrespective
of the possible justification of temporarily higher deficits in the transi-
tion economies. As a result, there is considerable market pressure to
reduce high deficits. Croatia and many other CE countries will thus
have to choose between alternatives that are politically equally unat-
tractive: a significant fiscal adjustment in the short term (e.g., reducing
the deficit by 3–4% of GDP in two years), or more moderate but disci-
plined adjustment spread out over several years (e.g., reduction of the
budget deficit by 1% of GDP during 3–4 consecutive years), which in
practice can mean during the term of office of several different govern-
ments. In both cases the key question will be whether the reduction of
the deficit is sustainable over the long term.
In Croatia, retaining public debt below 60% of GDP could also
require considerable efforts. Since the signing of the agreements with
the London and Paris Clubs in 1997, which allowed the settlement of
the liabilities of the inherited foreign debt, the public debt, and partic-
ularly its foreign component, has been growing very rapidly (Figure 5,
left panel). Between 1999 and 2001, the amount of guarantees issued
also rose considerably. Debt servicing absorbed about 2% of GDP in
recent years. The proportions of foreign and internal debt stabilised in
2001 at the level of 31% and 22% of GDP, respectively (Figure 5, right
panel). In an analysis of the dynamics of public debt in Croatia, the
IMF noted that the continuation of the current trends of borrowing is
unsustainable over the long term, and hence that it is unavoidable to
continue with recently initiated fiscal adjustment (IMF, 2002c). A sim-
ilar conclusion has been reached in a recent CNB analysis (Kraft and
Stuèka, 2002). The IMF estimates that in order for the public debt to
stabilise at 53% of GDP, it is necessary to reduce the budget deficit to
3.8% of GDP by 2005 at the latest, while maintaining real growth of
3.8% pa and average interest rate of 5%. And in order for the level of
the debt to be reduced long-term to less than 50% of GDP, the budget
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deficit should be cut to 3.3% of GDP by 2004, and to 2.6% by 2009.
This calculation, however, assumes an acceleration of the rate of
growth from 4.5% in 2003 to as much as 7% in 2006-2010, which is
unrealistic when compared with the estimated potential growth rate of
at most 5-6%.
What are the dangers, from a macroeconomic perspective, of
too great a reliance on foreign borrowing? Currently the conditions for
borrowing are favourable. On the international capital market, interest
rates are low; Croatia and other countries in the region have a very low
interest spread; and there is investor demand for their government
bonds. This, naturally, encourages the public sector to borrow. But one
should take into account the fact that the conditions for financing can
quickly change. High indebtedness increases the sensitivity of the
external sector and the national budget to exchange rate and interna-
tional interest rate changes, over which the monetary authorities have
little (the exchange rate) or no influence (the interest rates). Numerous
unfavourable constellations of these parameters are possible: pressure
on the exchange rate to depreciate would increase the domestic curren-
cy equivalent of interest and principal payments due, and hence the
budget deficit. The government would then have to increase taxes or
domestic interest rates in order to bring in extra revenue, or else issue
new domestic bonds, which would slow the economy. Weaker outlook
for growth would in turn increase the risk of investment in Croatia, and
foreign investors would then seek higher interest on any new interna-
tional issues of government bonds. Real shocks such as a slowdown in
the growth of the world economy and negative trends in international
capital markets would further complicate such negative dynamics.xvii
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Figure 5. Central government debt, 1993-2002
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Excessive reliance on external debt also has an unfavourable
effect on the development of domestic financial markets. The ratio of
foreign and internal debt is currently unfavourable: 62% is accounted
for by foreign and 38% by domestic public debt. Since the start of the
pension reforms, there is no reason for this ratio not to be improved.
According to regulations, the pensions funds must invest the major part
(50%) of the contributions collected in government bonds. Against this
background, it is not clear why the recent 500 million euro bond issue
to cover the transitional costs of pensions reform should have been in
euros instead of in kuna (see Babiæ, 2002). By issuing its bonds in a
foreign currency, the fiscal authorities took on an unnecessary curren-
cy risk, increased total foreign indebtedness and implicitly signalled to
the financial markets that not even the government has sufficient con-
fidence in the kuna to issue long-term kuna-denominated bonds. This
might affect in particular the private sector, given the interest in and the
potential for issuing corporate bonds in kuna.
CONCLUSION
The Croatian public has been faced for some time with rather
different views of the complex and long-lasting process of convergence
between Croatia and European economic integrations. In some circles,
a marked pessimism can be felt, with occasional knee-jerk statements
about the incompetence of the Croatian economy, the public adminis-
)9+1(79-)()-
$5-(.6"#&










;-*+5)9+1(
79!"#
#. 1(5)9+1(
79!"#
Source: HNB
tration and the society as a whole to be able to meet the conditions for
membership in the EU and the EMU in the next ten to fifteen years. In
other circles, unrealistic expectations about fast-track approach to the
EU are being stirred up, if only we could make this or that political
move to convince Brussels that we should at long last be accepted
“where we really belong”. The adoption of such opposing viewpoints
avoids a thorough analysis of conditions for membership in the EU and
EMU, and the conditions are interpreted quite simply as being very
rigid or only cosmetic. Another common feature of many evaluations is
superficiality in the analysis of the starting position of Croatia as against
the other applicant countries. For this reason one of the basic goals of
this paper was to analyse more thoroughly the economic significance of
the criteria for membership in the EU and EMU and objectively to com-
pare the initial positions of Croatia and the other CE countries. For this
reason great attention has been paid to the international comparability
of the statistical data and the preciseness of the economic argumenta-
tion. What are the basic conclusions of this analysis?
The rationale for the provisions concerning regional co-opera-
tion – the main additional (as compared with the other CE countries)
condition for Croatian membership in the EU – is to induce the states
in SEE to put their relationships on the same footing and to found these
relations on the same principles as those on which inter-state relations
are arranged within the EU. In spite of important advances (particular-
ly bilateral free trade agreements), Croatia still needs to show that it is
fulfilling all the provisions on regional cooperation.
The purpose of meeting the Copenhagen criteria is to create the
conditions for normal functioning of market economy and public ad-
ministration in CE countries before they join the EU. A certain flexi-
bility has been built into these conditions. At the moment, Croatia does
not lag significantly behind the CE average when it comes to insti-
tutional development and can be compared with Slovakia. In trade for-
eign exchange and banking systems, Croatia has converged consider-
ably to the EU standards. In the non-bank financial system, competi-
tion policy, the legal system and in corporate governance, the imple-
mentation of reforms in Croatia is about four years behind the central
European average. These transitional weaknesses of Croatia are close-
ly related to the low share of private sector in GDP (about 60%).
The purpose of fulfilling the Maastricht criteria is to create stable
macroeconomic conditions for the adoption of common currency and
participation in European Monetary Union as a higher degree of eco-
58
59
nomic integration than that of the common market. Although they have
to meet more stringent criteria for joining the EMU than Greece, Ireland,
Portugal and Spain did in the mid-nineties, the CE countries are now rel-
atively close to meeting these conditions. Croatia meets the criteria for
inflation, long-term interest rate and exchange rate stability. However,
there is considerable overshooting of the budget deficit, which has to be
reduced by 3.5% of GDP in order to reach the Maastricht norm of 3%.
The high level of public debt (52% of GDP) and its tendency to rise rap-
idly are an additional reason for fiscal adjustment.
The purpose of the whole process of convergence is to achieve
a gradual approximation of the level of per capita income of the coun-
tries in the region to the average of the less developed members of the
EU. Real convergence can be attained only with high rates of growth
are sustained in the long term, i.e., if they are accompanied by macro-
economic stability and institutional effectiveness. In other words,
meeting the criteria for joining the EU and the EMU is a necessary but
not sufficient condition for successful long-term economic develop-
ment. It is particularly important to bear in mind that hopes about sus-
tained convergence can suddenly and unexpectedly turn sour. For this
reason, the paper pays additional attention to the prospects for rapid
and stable growth and low inflation, the sustainability of external posi-
tions and the problem of fiscal adjustment.
The outlook for the long-term growth of Croatia and CE is
favourable: the potential growth rates in most of the countries are about
5% a year and there is plenty of room to speed up real convergence
because, apart from the Polish, all the CE economies have in the last 7
to 8 years grown more slowly than their long-term potential. Croatia is
in the group of economies with a high growth potential and has in addi-
tional achieved relatively high efficiency of investment. In this context,
Croatia needs to increase domestic saving rate. This will require greater
efforts in the development of the securities market and reducing the
dependence of the economy on the imports of intermediate industrial
products, which in turn requires the development of SMEs on the prin-
ciple of specialisation and their linkage with foreign partners.
In the CE countries and in Croatia in particular inflation has
been reduced to a very low level thanks to a firm monetary policy, cau-
tious fiscal policy and liberalisation of foreign trade and foreign invest-
ment. In the next few years, however, Croatia still has to address con-
siderable adjustment of the relative prices of energy, rents, services,
health care and education. For this reason monetary policy in the medi-
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um term too will have to carefully monitor inflationary expectations
and react quickly to inflationary pressures.
Real exchange rate developments, current account, foreign
direct investments and some other external sector indicators have in
recent years been more favourable than is usually suggested in discus-
sions of the international competitiveness of the Croatian economy. By
contrast, some financial indicators that are often given as Croatian
strong points – the credit rating and the interest spread on government
bonds – are less propitious than in the CE countries. Together with a
high level of foreign debt (52% of GDP, of which almost half is the
public sector debt), these vulnerabilities reduce the resistance of the
external sector to pressures emanating from the international capital
markets. Therefore, strengthening macroeconomic stability remains a
priority from an external perspective, too. 
A still greater challenge for macroeconomic policy and the pub-
lic sector in general will be found in the reduction of the budget deficit
and the stabilisation of public debt. Achieving these objectives will
require a much political will and perseverance.
There are, of course, other limitations that have not been dis-
cussed separately in this paper but could slow the Croatian economy in
its achievement of nominal and real convergence. This relates primari-
ly to the high rate of unemployment, the further deregulation and lib-
eralisation of the economy in line with EU legislation, and reforms of
the labour market and the civil service. If there is one consistent lesson
to be learned from the experience of countries that have passed through
the process of convergence with the EU – and indeed from the entire
historical experience of the industrial countries – it is the necessity of
persevering in the implementation of reforms and in the cautious han-
dling of macroeconomic policy.
i Hungary, for example, signed a Europe Agreement in December 1991 and submitted an
application for membership in March 1994. In July 1997 the European Commission rec-
ommended the European Council to start accession negotiations with Hungary
(European Commission, 1997). The talks started in March 1998 and ended in October
2002.
ii Croatia can export all industrial goods to the EU, all processed agricultural products
and, with certain exceptions, all agricultural products without payment of customs duties
and without quantity restrictions. From 1 January 2002 Croatia liberalised the import
of about 77% of industrial products from the EU; complete import liberalisation is to fol-
low by the end of 2007. Croatia also bound itself to liberalise 75% of the import of agri-
cultural goods by 2006, and to fully liberalise the import of agricultural products, fish
and fish products, by the end of 2007.
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iii The last paragraph of the Agreement says: Recalling the European Union's readiness
to integrate to the fullest possible extent the Republic of Croatia into the political and
economic mainstream of Europe and its status as a potential candidate for EU member-
ship on the basis of the Treaty on European Union and fulfilment of the criteria defined
by the European Council in June 1993, subject to successful implementation of this
Agreement, notably regarding regional cooperation, the EU and Croatia have agreed as
follows.
iv For various interpretations of the evolutionary clause, see the Ministry of European
Integration (www.mei.hr) and Bartlett (2002). Of particular interest is this quote from
the report of the European Integration Minister to the Croatian Parliament in 2001:
“although there is no provision in our Agreement like that contained in the Europe
Agreements, expressing the statement of the EU that it accepts the fact that integration
into the EU is the priority political objective of the countries that were signing the
Europe Agreements and that the EU is ready to help them to achieve this objective, this
does not in any way depict the Croatian route into Europe in a negative light. In debates
about this matter (in which Croatia asked to have the said provisions incorporated into
the SAA, without the proposal being accepted) it became clearer that the EU today, in
the changed circumstances after the calming of the historical enthusiasm with which it
wished to embrace the transitional countries after the fall of the Berlin Wall and com-
munism in Europe, is less ready to open up great expectations at the drop of a hat and
stir up the expectations of potential new applicants, until they themselves show their
ability to carry out the obligations that lead them towards accomplishment of the stan-
dards and criteria of the EU. And the Union did not adopt this more reserved stance
because of Croatia or against Croatia, but simply out of caution and the difficulties with
which it sees and experiences the current greatest wave of enlargement” (Minister for
European Integration, 2002).
v CARDS – Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation) is
the main programme of financial and technical assistance from the EU to the countries
of SEE.
vi At the end of 2001, the public debt of Austria amounted to 62% of GDP, that of
Belgium to 108%, Greece 100%, Italy 109% and the Netherlands 53%. 
vii The relatively high per capita income of Greece in 1981 largely reflected the overval-
ued exchange rate of the drachma; after devaluation in 1982, the Greek per capita
income fell from 63% to 40% of the EU average. 
viii These data include downward revisions of GDP growth in Croatia for the 1999-2001
period, published at the end of September 2002. 
ix Lower employment was not the main reason for the rapid growth in productivity;
because of the relatively high rate of growth of GDP, productivity would have increased
rapidly (at a rate of 3.6% pa) even assuming a rate of unemployment similar to the CE
country average (i.e., about 0.4% pa).
x Unemployment figures are based on ILO methodology, i.e., household labour force sur-
veys.
xi For the greater statistical representativeness of the sample, apart from the countries
in Table 2 (Croatia, HR; Czech Republic, CZ; Hungary, HU; Poland, PL; Slovakia, SK
and Slovenia, SI), this calculation also includes the Baltic countries (Estonia, EE;
Latvia, LV; Lithuania, LT), Bulgaria (BG), Romania (RO), Russia (Russia) and the
Ukraine (UA).
xii Data in Table 3 refer to the general government deficit calculated on accruals basis.
The Croatian public is more familiar with the narrow definition of budget deficit, i.e., the
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deficit of the central government. In 1999, the central government deficit amounted to
7.4% of GDP, in 2000 it was reduced to 5.7%, in 2001 to 5.4%,and in 2002 it is project-
ed at 4.3% of GDP.
xiii In the system of national accounts, Y = C + G + I + X – M, where Y is gross domes-
tic product, C private consumption, G government spending, I gross investment, X
imports and M exports. Domestic saving, S, is expressed as S = Y – C – G. According to
the definition, S – I = X – M, i.e., the shortfall in domestic saving is equivalent to the
deficit in the balance of payments.
xiv See Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Croatia, 2001, Table 21-5, p. 327.
xv To be more precise, potential growth rate was 8% in 1995, about 2% in the recession
of 1999, and 4.5% in the first half of 2002. Potential growth rate changes depending on
the growth of total factor productivity, production capacity and employment. The statis-
tical method employed in Figure 3 (the Hodrick-Prescott filter) captures these factors
indirectly. The 1991-1993 period is not relevant for analysis because the transition
economies were in the so-called “great transformational recession” at the time, which
was exacerbated in Croatia by the Homeland War.
xvi These ratings were established by the agencies Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s, and
Fitch. Some smaller ratings agencies specialising in emerging markets have rated
Croatian government bonds at the lowest level of investment grade.
xvii The difficulties Brazil is currently grappling with are a vivid illustration of these
problems. In the expectation of presidential elections in October 2002, fears appeared
on the financial markets already in April 2002 that if the opposition won, the new admin-
istration would give up the goal of the present government to stabilise the share of pub-
lic debt in GDP. These fears were sufficient to set off a negative debt dynamics even
though the government had made no policy mistakes and the real fundamentals of Brazil
have been sound. Brazil’s public debt amounts to 55% of GDP, and is mostly issued on
the domestic market, but indexed to the exchange rate or domestic short-term interest
rates.
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